HUMANE
Heads of
University Management & Administration Network in Europe
SEMINAR
Université Claude Bernard Lyon
1
Friday 9th to Saturday 10th November 2001
Summary
|
The seminar opened with a kind welcome by the
President of the Université Claude Bernard, who pointed out that
recent changes concerning structures and rules of governance at national level
had led to what he called “une petite révolution”, with a number of new
problems. However, in another
introductory speech of welcome, our co-host Françoise Granger (Ecole Normale
Supérieure de Lyon) recalled that when a university had been established in
Lyon 100 years earlier there had been a specific expression of thanks for
equipment bought with public funds. It
was therefore clear that the idea of financial responsibility was
long-established. This was the idea
which would be re-examined in the present seminar.
Session 1
Jean-Pascal Bonhotal – Université Claude Bernard, Lyon
François Paquis – Université Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand
This dual presentation examined the position of the host university (UCBL) in relation to the national situation outlined first by François Paquis. François noted that in theory universities were free to look after their own funds, but that in practice there was not a great deal of solid autonomy. The words and ideas in official texts were not entirely matched in the situation on the ground.
Since 1989 universities had been able to negotiate with the State for small amounts of money. There were some positive aspects to this, for example the need for self-evaluation, a greater awareness of funding possibilities, and a potentially more dynamic role for the university President and his team. These features were enhanced by the change to lump-sum budgets. However, flexibility or diversification of funding sources was quite difficult when the State input was very rigid, with many earmarked (hypothecated) funds, and when certain key items were not included in the university’s own budget - for example, staff salaries were separate, and universities did not own their own estate.
There had been progress, notably in the area of contracts and target-setting, with negotiations on plans put forward by the university. This involved four-year plans and an account of strengths and weaknesses. This had produced a greater sense of awareness and a more transparent role for the administration. However, such progress had in itself shown up weaknesses, and François illustrated various issues which could be examined in any future review of the present system – notably, the extent to which such contracts or agreements with the State were binding, the issue of staff salaries, and the ownership of the estate.
A further area of major change was that of budgetary
allocations. Instead of a regular
series of contributions for particular items through the year, the university
would now receive a single lump-sum.
This entailed criteria and choices for resource allocation and
activity. Meanwhile, there was pressure
to extend sources of income, and universities would need to be careful to avoid
falling from over-reliance on the State to an extreme dependence on some other
source of funding.
Jean-Pascal Bonhotal then elaborated on this
general review by looking at four main themes in the context of his own
university, the third biggest in France with 27,000 students and 5,000
staff.. Each theme was examined in
terms of internal and external autonomy and accountability. The four main
themes were as follows:
The structure of the university was very democratic, with representation of the Faculties at all levels. While on the one hand it was true that no other public service in France enjoyed the same constitutional autonomy as universities, there were a number of practical limits, and a particular need to be able to account for all spending. Jean-Pascal drew attention also to the relatively recent innovation of undergraduate departments to set alongside the various research schools and federations. The main advantage of this democratic structure was internal consensus on major issues, but the corresponding disadvantage was the extreme slowness of decision-making.
Teaching and
Training
offered the most elastic form of autonomy.
Universities are free to determine the content of their courses, except
for certain degrees awarded by the State, and there is no formal quality
control. UCBL had used this freedom
very considerably, for example to encourage inter-disciplinarity, and to develop
professional training. This had led to
a growth in numbers.
In research
the university was free to develop its own research themes, but the State gives
grants only to laboratories or units which have been recognised on the
Ministry’s approved list. Contracts and funding are worked out on a four-year
basis. UCBL also has its own company
for commercialisation (EZUS-Lyon 1), which contributed 60% of research funding
for the institution. This large
company, with a turnover of 25 million euros, naturally requires accountability
for customers and stakeholders. The Conseil Régional helps with new subjects
of research, and with campus development or student activities.
In respect of funding, the university’s basic budget showed a 60% contribution from the government, but if one added the EZUS funds the ratio was 45% from the State to 55% of its own funds. This in turn reflected the French situation whereby staff salaries were not part of the budget - if one included such salaries it was true that 80% of funds came from the State. J-P B felt that the introduction of global budgets spread over several years had actually reduced the amount of accountability – the main external audits were rather infrequent and irregular. UCBL had therefore developed its own methods of checking expenditure (for example, scrutiny by a Finance Committee, but also technical measures such as performance indicators).
Discussion of this dual presentation focused on the
inter-relationships between the key figures at the head of the
institution. For example, to whom is
the Secrétaire-Général accountable,
the University Board or the Ministrer of Education? It was explained that, following a public announcement of
available posts, the University President chose the person who seemed most
suitable, for a maximum of ten years.
The Secrétaire-Général was
then directly responsible to the President, who could terminate his or her
contract at any time. Various
participants found this a difficult position, relative to accountability, since
it seemed to create an obvious clash of loyalties if the Secrétaire-Général were to feel obliged to investigate or complain
about the activity of the President himself, or of close contacts. There was a contrast with the British
position where the University Secretary was responsible to the Board, in a
triangular relationship with the Vice-Chancellor. The fact that in terms of French law the President was ultimately
responsible meant that the relationship was different.
A further issue concerned the fact that staff were
civil servants as opposed to university employees – had any thought been given
to changing this position. It was
explained that the status of civil servant was a profoundly cultural issue, and
that while there was some support for a change such views were heretical.
On the issue of autonomy concerning buildings,
Jean-Pascal referred again to the recent decision giving universities
responsibility for the upkeep of their buildings and estate, which nevertheless
remained in the hands of the State. He estimated that UCBL would need about 50m
FFR to do this properly – with the problem that there were no extra State
funds! Apart from this financial
constraint the presenters did feel that the legislation had been beneficial and
positive.
The Role of the Head of Administration in preserving institutional
integrity and adherence to the standards of public accountability
John Lauwerys suggested that the Head of
Administration in a University has a particular responsibility for ensuring
that his/her University acts in accordance with the national and international
law as it affects the University, along with the University's own governing
rules or internal laws. In general this
role is carried out as part of the normal professional role of the Head of
Administration and rarely causes internal conflict or significant difficulties.
On relatively rare occasions some senior members of the University, including even the Rector (President) may propose to act in ways which conflict with the University's own established procedures and contrary to proper standards of public conduct. In recent years in the UK there had been a number of such instances which led to public criticism when the facts became known, and even to investigation by the National Audit Office (an office which is responsible to Parliament for the proper expenditure of public funds). This led to full reports being published and measures being subsequently taken to reduce the likelihood of repetition of these problems.
John then went on to draw on four major case studies
to examine the position of the Head of Administration when such serious events
occur. His comments on these UK
universities were all taken from the publicly available reports published by
the National Audit Office. The
activities which had been criticised included excessive overseas visits (with
family members), abuse of privileges such as official transport, nepotism, and
a lack of full reporting to the governing body.
On this basis he suggested some general principles
which one might establish to protect institutional integrity and proper
standards of public accountability. Crucially, he suggested that the Head of
Administration has an absolutely central role in providing such safeguards - this
raised an immediate contrast with the situation in France since most of the
case studies from Britain showed how the Vice-Chancellor himself had been under
investigation for abuse of his position. In all cases, there had been a
situation where the governing body of the university did not know what was
going on. He therefore reached four
main conclusions regarding common factors from the case studies:
·
The
Vice-Chancellor or Principal in each case had lacked proper ethical standards
and judgement
·
The
Vice-Chancellor had been too close to the Chair of the governing body
·
There
had been a lack of openness or proper reporting procedures
·
None
of the HEIs had had a sufficiently senior member of staff to deal with the
issues.
John drew attention to the work in Britain of the
Committee of Standards in Public Life, first set up under the chairmanship of
Lord Nolan and which had elaborated a set of seven principles of conduct for
public servants, known now as the Nolan Principles:
·
Selflessness
·
Integrity
·
Objectivity
·
Accountability
·
Openness
·
Honesty
·
Leadership
Requirements were that the head of administration
should hold a senior position immediately below that of the Rector, and with a
direct line of responsibility to the governing body. He or she should have a permanent contract with a high level of
job security, and should of course possess high standards of professional
competence and personal integrity..
In discussion, there was some surprise
among participants that systems of audit had not worked. It was observed that (for example) in the
Netherlands consultants had audit functions both for finance and for general
management. John Lauwerys noted that in
the UK there were systems both for internal and external audit, but that
generally such measures involved either overviews or samples. The key issue was that of whistle-blowing.[1] John also assured participants that there
were procedures in place in most universities, but that a determined or
powerful individual might still find ways to by-pass such rules. Participants recognised that control by the
head of administration was both necessary and difficult. John also stressed that the four prominent
cases which he had mentioned involved only two universities out of more than
100, with the other two institutions being sub-university units of higher
education.
The view was also expressed that while the
presentation had focused on behaviour at the top of the organisation there was
a need for all staff to be operating under the same principles.
Jef van de Riet, Tilburg University
Jef van de Riet explained
that in the early 1980s, Dutch universities had been confronted with severe
retrenchments. The first retrenchment operation, which went by the name of Taakverdeling en concentration
(“division of tasks and concentration”), took place in 1983, leading to a
cutback[2]
in the number of faculties and programmes of study. A special committee drew up
proposals pertaining[3]
to the closure of programmes of study at each university. These proposals were
taken over by the government. This process was repeated in 1987 under the name Selectieve groei en krimp (“Selective
growth and shrinkage”), which not only closed down programmes of study but
created new ones. This time, it was the government itself which masterminded[4]
the whole operation.
Together with these
budgetary cuts of about 20%, the financial autonomy of the universities was
extended, with budgets increasingly being allocated as lump sums. Specially
earmarked allocations began to disappear altogether, culminating in 1995 in the
transfer of the buildings and grounds to the universities. The budget for
buildings and major repairs was divided among the universities and added to the
lump sum budget. The autonomy of the universities also became greater when they
became employers in their own right (1994) and adopted a new management
structure (1998). Generally, Jef reported
a view among colleagues (shared by members from other countries) that the
“gift” of autonomy was actually a way of transferring awkward problems of
resource allocation from government.
Parallel to this
development, the universities had taken up the challenge and given a new
interpretation of their accountability to government and society. For example,
a new system was developed in the 1980s to test the quality of teaching and
research (visitation system), and in the annual report an account is given of
the financial and social policies of the university. At his own university an annual publication lists research
interests and links, and this book was used by press offices and others. Autonomy in teaching was restricted in that
it was not possible to start a new teaching programme without permission, and
bearing in mind national provision in the subject.
For a time, it seemed as if
a stable budget perspective had been found, and that autonomy and
accountability were in equilibrium. However, over the past three years new
money had become available to the universities. This money was not added to the
lump sum, but rather had to be “earned” - through all kinds of bureaucratic
procedures - by applying to the government or committees. In addition, the
government had imposed new and tighter rules for financial management, and a
bill[5]
had been introduced in Parliament to switch[6]
to a system of accreditation for programmes of study, threatening a new wave of
bureaucracy. Thus new money meant new
rules as well.
To escape from this
bureaucracy, the universities have increasingly been moving into the market,
and it appeared that there was even talk of ending the government funding of
the Master programmes. But at the same
time there was centralisation of a different kind in that a collective empolyers’
organisation (VSNU) had been set up, and was now responsible for negotiating
working conditions for employees. This
did allow for some freedom on the part of individual institutions, and so it
was still possible for Jef to conclude that over the past twenty years autonomy
had increased significantly.
Many of the questions in discussion
concerned the issue of accreditation, which was found by many participants to
be an expensive business. Jef clarified
that the visitation system was indeed funded by the universities
themselves.
It was also noted that over
several decades the Dutch system had moved from being one of the most overtly
democratic systems in Europe to an extremely managerial style. In the light of this, questions were asked
about the way in which this had affected internal accountability. Jef observed that there was now less need to
consult the university Council on changes in policy, and generally less time
was spent on internal process.
Autonomie et responsabilité des universités
de la Communauté française en Belgique
- Le cas de l’Université catholique de Louvain
Anne-Marie Kumps outlined the legal basis of higher
education in Belgium, and the particular constitutional changes effected in
1988 and 1989. She emphasised in
particular the universities of the French Community, and the difference between
State-funded and so-called “free” institutions (universités “communautaires” et
“libres”), before moving on to concentrate on the Université
catholique de Louvain UCL), which was a free university based on religious
affiliation but also with public subsidies.
After a description of UCL she examined the degrees
of autonomy relating to various areas such as governance, teaching and
research, finances and human resources, as well as estates. She described the situation as being one of
broad-based autonomy with constraints in certain areas, and discussed the
relative chances of a future with more autonomy or more limits.
Ian Powell based his presentation on his own
experience, having worked for nearly 40 years in various UK universities, and
also in the national body which is responsible for distributing public money to
individual universities.
After an introduction on the status of UK
universities as institutions legally separate from the State, he briefly
compared the size of the UK system in 1960 and in 2000 – the number of
universities had increased from 30 to over 110, while student numbers had
increased sixfold, with a very great increase in the total amount of public
funds going to universities. Rather than 5% of school-leavers entering
university, the figure was now 33%. In
this context he then described the environment of governance and accountability
for universities in 1960: institutions were small, élite and dominated by the
idea of academic autonomy and self-government; the idea of accountability to
anyone outside the university, or outside the body of academics, was imprecise
and implicit. By contrast, in 2000 there were larger institutions with multiple
functions, accountable to various external and internal groups, all of whom
consider that they have rights in respect of the university; accountability was
now clear and explicit. Ian explained the nature of these multiple
accountabilities, which included society and the public, government, students
and their parents, the local region, and industry in general. Moreover, interest groups such as alumni,
funders and benefactors, and all recipients of services, not to mention new
bodies such as the European Union, meant that accountability was a very broad
concept.
The changed nature of accountability had produced a
major challenge for those responsible for managing universities : senior
academics and professional administrators had a much more complex and demanding
role to play than in previous times.
However, in Ian’s view the challenge was also an opportunity to
introduce a culture of more professional management and to develop professional
values, even if there were also numerous possibilities of conflict between the
individual professional values of managers and the self-interest of the
university. Examples of such conflicts
were given, developing some of the issues raised on the previous day by John
Lauwerys. For example, the moral
dilemmas caused by the temptation to present data in the most flattering light
for the institution, or to indulge in public relations. Similarly, there were
ethical problems inherent in accepting funds form non-public sources which were
deemed to be anti-social.
The essential answer was for heads of administration
to state professional values and ensure that all colleagues worked in
accordance with them – the seven principles of public life were an important
guide. But ultimately the message had
to be that survival depended on management rather than (mere) administration,
with proper risk assessment and regular communication to all relevant staff.
[1] The expression relates to the enforcement of rules by referees in various sports. Blowing the whistle in this context is when an employee alerts the organisation to dishonesty or improper practice (for example, in safety procedures) on the part of others. In order that such complaints may be made without fear, good employers will put in place procedures to protect the anonymity and working conditions of such “whistle-blowers”.
[2] = reduction
[3] = relating
[4] The word illustrates how English forms verbs from many sources. The two words “master” and “mind” first become one word to describe a person with great knowledge, and particularly someone who inspires or controls the ideas behind an organisation. Then it becomes a verb, to mastermind, with (as here) past tense.
[5] A bill, here, is a proposal to introduce legislation; when it is passed by Parliament it becomes an Act. The distinction in French is between the proposition de loi and the projet de loi.
[6] = change